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INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, the European Commission in a landmark Green Paper declared its aspiration to 
create the Single European Market (SEM) in telecommunications. Given the historic path 
of development of telecommunications across the then 12 members of the EU, this was a 
radical statement of intent. Until the early 1980s, the provision of telecommunications 
services was almost exclusively state-centric, in the hands of a series of monopoly state-
owned Postal, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) administrations. However, by the late 
1980s, there were signs of disruptive change to what was one of the most stable of the 
utility sectors. First in the UK, and, thereafter, across a number of the leading economic 
members of the EU, telecommunications came to be considered a sector in which market 
competition could be developed in new service areas and internationalisation 
countenanced, to some extent at least. For the EU, a policy ‘window of opportunity’ thus 
materialised which the European Commission, interested in expanding its acquis where 
feasible, proved keen to exploit (Schneider, Dang-Nguyen and Werle 1994). Thus began 
a by now well-documented policy journey in pursuit of the SEM in telecommunications. 
Twenty years on, in the Commission’s current review of the state of the 
telecommunications sector, it is clear that whilst a transformation has occurred in the 
governance of telecommunications across a by now 27 member EU, the completion of 
the SEM is still a policy goal. At the national level, monopoly state ownership has been 
replaced by comprehensive and detailed independent regulation of a complex, 
differentiated series of telecommunications markets (Thatcher 1999). At the EU level, a 
plethora of legislation – the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework (ECRF) 
in its current incarnation – sets the broad conditions for competitive functioning of these 
telecommunications markets across Europe (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). However, 
the European Commission, charged with the task of monitoring the development of the 
ECRF, has articulated in its review the existence and stubborn persistence of a number of 
core impediments to competition. Its proposed solution is the creation of a European 
Electronic Communications Markets Authority (EECMA), the background to and nature 
and implications of which are the subject of this paper. 
The paper argues that EECMA, if agreed to by EU Member States, would amount to a 
new European regulatory body in telecommunications with supranational dimensions, 
having already been likened by the current European Commissioner for Information 
Society and Media to a ‘“European FCC”’ (Reding 2007). EECMA would be made up of 
regulatory experts from across Europe, would have an as yet unspecified-in-detail 
relationship with the European Commission, and would be directly answerable to the 
European Parliament. The paper argues that such a development would mark a 
qualitatively significant departure from the kind of telecommunications governance 
which has developed to date at EU level. Though the idea of creating a European 
regulatory authority for telecommunications has been floated in the past by the 
Commission (Bartle 1999), its creation has been quite firmly resisted by Member States. 
Instead, as witnessed in the series of regulatory committees created by the ECRF, not 
least the European Regulators Group (ERG), EU telecommunications governance is 
much more ‘intergovernmental’ than ‘supranational’ in nature, that is, decision making 
power is mostly in the hands of national level interests.  
Early signs suggest that there is considerable opposition to EECMA from regulatory 
quarters at the national level and the ERG itself. It is the latter’s status - which would be 
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to a considerable extent ‘supra-nationalised’ into EECMA – which would alter most 
radically with EECMA’s creation. The paper contends that a move in this direction would 
strengthen significantly the European ‘regulatory’ state (Majone 1996) in 
telecommunications along supranational lines, a major qualitative shift of approach to 
that developed thus far in EU telecommunications policy.  However, should EECMA be 
rejected by EU Member States - perhaps the most plausible outcome of the current debate 
- then the ERG’s  and the European Commission’s regulatory powers are likely to be 
increased in telecommunications nonetheless. This outcome would constitute a much 
more path-dependent development of EU telecommunications policy and, whilst possibly 
considered sub-optimal by the Commission, would nevertheless be to its institutional 
advantage in pursuing the SEM in telecommunications. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief resume of the core 
politico-institutional features of the development of EU telecommunications policy to the 
point of the current review, emphasising the predominantly (though not exclusively) 
‘intergovernmental’ nature of the system and highlighting the key junctures at which the 
possible creation of a European regulatory authority for telecommunications emerged to 
prominence. The third section of the paper focuses on inter-institutional politics that 
developed between the European Commission and the ERG in the lead-up to the final 
proposal of EECMA in November 2007. From this, the proposed core structural and 
functional characteristics of EECMA are explored. The final section of the paper draws 
some conclusions on the significance of the proposal of EECMA and provides some 
tentative predictions on the likely outcome of the current debate around its creation or 
otherwise. 
 
THE POLITICO-INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF EU 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 
Any decision by Member States to create and develop a new area of policy at the EU 
level is always underpinned by consideration of the extent to which loss of sovereignty 
can be sanctioned -  the current debate on EECMA is conditioned by this as much as 
anything else. The then novel telecommunications policy context of the 1980s and early 
1990s in Europe made this a particularly significant consideration then too. At the 
national level, a number of states, most notably the UK as a forerunner, had begun to 
cede direct control over telecommunications to new independent public national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs) (Thatcher 2002) whose role it was to manage the evolution 
of the sector along competitive lines. The emergence of this US-style approach to 
telecommunications vested great responsibility in, and thus give great power to, the 
regulatory authority to create and police the set of detailed rules required to deliver even 
a minimum level of competition. It also unleashed a growing number of large, 
increasingly commercially oriented, telecommunications service providers which tended 
to be the main subject of regulation given their status as incumbents in well established 
and newly emerging markets. Though in the first instance tentative in their approach, 
these companies soon became international in outlook and corporate ambition, whilst still 
keen to protect home commercial territory as much as possible. New entrant 
telecommunications service providers – including ambitious overseas companies from 
the US – most accustomed to neither the traditional lack of competition in 
telecommunications nor its national commercial ‘inwardness’ – added to the expectation 
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that telecommunications should develop along international lines (Curwen and Whalley 
2004). On the demand side, the intensification of the most recent phase of economic 
globalisation through the 1980s prompted multinational enterprise telecommunications 
customers to exert pressure for telecommunications services – both traditional basic and 
newer value added – to be made available to them to facilitate their international 
corporate function. 
All these important changes combined in the EU to suggest to the European 
Commission that the coordination of telecommunications market regulation might be at 
the very least explored as a means of facilitating the future development of the sector 
(European Commission 1984). Given the nature of the EU, with 10 and, as the 1980s 
proceeded, 12 different telecommunications sectors, the Commission quickly came to the 
opinion that a legislative package would be required to frame the internationalisation of  
telecommunications governance to the EU level. However, it was also clear that any 
movement towards the Europeanisation of telecommunications through the EU route was 
likely to be conducted tentatively. The European Commission’s 1987 Green Paper on 
creating the SEM in telecommunications (European Commission 1987), whilst bold in its 
overall goal, was more modest in the proposed measures to achieve it. The paper was 
deeply equivocal in nature in terms of its reflections on telecommunications 
liberalisation.  On the one hand, it argued for EU-wide competition in the markets for 
telecommunications terminal equipment and value-added services. It also called for the 
separation of what were then termed operational and regulatory functions, the implication 
being that the PTT administration, or evolving variant thereof, could no longer determine 
the conditions for a sector in which it was, or would become, a market player. On the 
other hand, the Green Paper declared the right of Member States, where desired, to 
maintain on a monopoly basis so-called reserved services, principally voice telephony. 
The tentativeness of the European Commission reflects the classic position of 
political fragility which any EU institution keen to effect Europeanisation in a policy area 
faces (Humphreys and Simpson 1996). It is also indicative of the power differential 
existent between the national and the European level. The especially deep national 
centricity of telecommunications added resonance to the situation. Yet within merely 
seven years of the Green Paper’s publication, EU Member States had agreed to liberalise 
all their telecommunications markets and infrastructures (European Council of Ministers 
1993; European Council of Ministers 1994). What factors can explain such a swift and 
remarkable transition and what were its operational consequences for the governance of 
telecommunications in Europe? Most importantly, certain of the most powerful Member 
States of the EU – the UK, Germany and then France - became convinced that there were 
more opportunities than threats from the liberalisation of telecommunications 
domestically and internationally. Such views on the neo-liberal agenda in 
telecommunications were by no means identical (Hulsink 1999). Differences existed 
regarding the extent to which liberalisation should occur, as well as its timing 
(Humphreys and Simpson 2005). However, by the end of 1994, even the French, who 
were initially deeply reticent about liberalisation of voice telephony, became convinced 
that their domestic sector and its companies stood to benefit from telecommunications 
market opening internationally. The EU policy arena provided an important and relatively 
secure and controllable context for this to take place initially. The EU also allowed 
Member States like France, which still valued the public service traditions of 
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telecommunications even in an increasingly competitive environment (Humphreys 1990), 
to ensure that legislative provision was secured at EU level to protect universal service in 
telecommunications. For the less enthusiastic of the EU liberalisers, the position was 
somewhat different. The smaller EU states, as well as Spain and Italy, were initially 
reticent about liberalisation. However, whilst for some there seemed little or no realistic 
chance of their domestic telecommunications service providers striking out successfully 
in international telecommunications markets, they became aware of the perceived 
material benefits of liberalisation from the early experiences of the forerunner in change, 
the UK. Here, rapidly modernising and competitive telecommunications services markets 
appeared to be instrumental in attracting large volumes of inward international foreign 
direct investment and in ensuring lower prices and improving quality in the offerings 
made available to customers, corporate business and private individual. The protections 
that were to be afforded too to universal service served to assuage further any concerns 
about deterioration in the public service underpinnings of telecommunications. However, 
a concern still remained about possible demise of the incumbent PTT in a new 
competitive environment, an issue which to some extent reverberates through the current 
debate on the creation of EECMA. 
The EU institutional level, through the activities of the European Commission 
principally, played a major role in the relatively short journey to agreement on full 
liberalisation in telecommunications. A debate has arisen among communication policy 
scholars and political scientists on the roles which ‘supranational’ forces played in the 
move towards agreement among Member States to liberalise comprehensively their 
telecommunications sectors. Some emphasise the entrepreneurial role played by the 
European Commission in driving the EU telecommunications policy agenda forward 
(Sandholtz 1998). Others stress the essential ‘intergovernmentalism’ of the process, 
Thatcher (2001) arguing that, whilst a significant player, the European Commission acted 
much more as a partner of EU Member States. There is no doubt that the Commission 
was prepared to ‘take on’ Member States, as evidenced in its use of the article 86 
procedure of the EU Treaty to force through liberalisation directives in terminal 
equipment (European Commission 1988) and services (European Commission 1990). 
This process effectively by-passed the Council of Ministers and was deemed universally 
by EU Member States to be undemocratic. However, the Commission was aware that 
most Member States – not least the most powerful in politico-economic terms – were in 
favour of the substance of the directives. The legal challenges presented to the 
Commission’s action were rejected by the European Court of Justice (European Court of 
Justice 1991; 1992) thus raising the possibility of significant power to force through 
further telecommunications liberalisation being available to the Commission to exercise.  
However, in practice, it has proven more anxious to pursue compromise and 
consensus among EU Member States. Since 1990, liberalisation directives have only 
been passed using article 86 as a matter of procedure, as a consequence of the legal cases 
of the late 1980s. Equally, the different developmental phases of EU telecommunications 
policy, which can be viewed as a successive series of policy equillibria (Simpson 2008), 
have been prefaced by major consultation exercises, these having taking place in 1992, 
1999, and 2006 respectively. Such exercises have prefaced a major reorganisation and 
development of EU telecommunications policy pursued through the legislative route. In 
July 1993 Member States agreed to liberalise all voice telephonic services across the EU 
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by 1998 (European Council of Ministers 1993), proceeded a year later by similar 
agreement regarding telecommunications infrastructures (European Council of Ministers 
1994). This required a battery of subsequent legislation, both liberalising and 
harmonising in scope, including legislation setting minimum standards for universal 
service (Natalicchi 2001). In 2003, as a result of the review launched in 1999, the EU 
undertook a legislative rationalisation telecommunications regulation where the by then 
expansive number of directives framing the functioning of the sector was reduced from 
20 to 7 in a newly named Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework (ECRF). 
The current ECRF review aims to undertake further significant rationalisation, the aim 
being to remove as much sector specific ex-ante regulation from the system as possible, 
instead leaving the governance of most telecommunications markets to the general EU 
competition law framework, an area in which the EU’s powers are particularly well-
developed.  
Thus, since the late 1980s, it is clear that a well established, developing system of 
legislation has couched the evolution of the telecommunications sector across the 
expanding EU. In this respect, EU telecommunications policy can be described as 
‘supranational’ in nature. However, the vast majority of the legislative measures agreed 
by Member States are in the form of directives which give considerable scope to Member 
States to interpret them within the relevant national legal tradition. Much more 
significantly, an examination of the implementation and day to day functioning of the 
regulatory framework yields important insights into its character. The more well 
established and detailed EU telecommunications policy has become, the more elaborate is 
the regulatory apparatus and more intensive the regulatory workload across the EU to 
deliver its various parameters, despite recent moves to legislative rationalisation. Here, it 
is possible to argue that telecommunications provides a clear example of the creation and 
functioning of a ‘regulatory’ state in Europe (Majone, 1996; Seidman and Gilmour 1986). 
A complex two-level, pluri-lateral governance network (Humphreys and Simpson, 2008) 
has developed across the EU in which a variety of public regulatory actors interact in the 
functioning of the sector. This network, operating at national and EU level, is 
predominantly, though not exclusively, intergovernmental in nature, even regarding 
policy deliberation which occurs in European level contexts. Therein lies the key to 
understanding the proposal by the European Commission, whose motivations are 
inherently European, of EECMA.  
In practice, the substance of the legislation comprising the ECRF is implemented on a 
‘day to day’ basis by a series of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). At the EU 
level, the European Commission has played an important role in policing the 
implementation of the telecommunications regulatory framework, though its scope for 
action is de-limited by the institutional resources at its disposal. Since the agreement to 
liberalise fully telecommunications across the EU, the Commission has taken 
considerable pains determine the degree to which Member States have fulfilled their 
obligations under the framework. It has required regular reports from NRAs on the 
competitive conditions in their telecommunications markets and has published regular 
reviews of the telecommunications sector, in which concerns about various aspects of the 
development of competition in the markets of its Member States have been voiced (see 
Humphreys and Simpson 2005, Chapters 5 and 6). An important feature of the EU 
telecommunications regulatory framework has been the existence of regulatory 
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committees of experts at the EU level. One of the earliest of these, the Open Network 
Provision committee was particularly influential in developing agreed positions on the 
regulatory functioning and subsequent development of telecommunications at EU level. 
As the telecommunications regulatory framework has become more substantive, these 
committees have increased in importance.  
A major development was the creation of the European Regulators Group as a 
consequence of the 1999 review of electronic communications. This independent (i.e. not 
established as part of the formal EU decision-making framework), advisory committee 
contains representatives from the EU’s telecommunications NRAs and is, importantly, 
resourced - and Chaired in a non-voting capacity - by the Commission. The ERG’s 
modus-operandi is essentially ‘intergovernmental’ in nature, though the presence of the 
Commission has afforded the latter a kind of supervisory perspective which has proved 
fundamentally important in influencing the proposal to create EECMA. In essence, the 
Commission has, by its own admission, aimed towards the creation of some kind of 
regulatory partnership with Member States’ NRAs. By contrast, the relationship between 
the ERG and the European Commission has been recognised as difficult in the first 
instance, though improving (Reding, 2007) reflecting the tension that has existed between 
the national and the EU level for a considerable part of the history of EU 
telecommunications policy.  
Thus, EU Member States and the European Commission though having resolved to 
pursue the common goal of liberalisation in telecommunications have often been uneasy 
co-participants in the enterprise. The Commission has been motivated by the functional 
goal of creating and administering the EU telecommunications regulatory framework, as 
well as cementing politically its institutional role in the European and global 
telecommunications policy landscape. National Member States  - and to a lesser extent 
their NRAs – have struggled with a core dilemma of neo-liberalism: the pursuit of 
internationally competitive markets holds the attendant risk of damaging national 
commercial interests. As a consequence, often Member States have aimed to create only 
the degree and pattern of competition that is perceived to be in the national, not 
necessarily the European, interest. The consequence has been efforts by the Commission 
to see transferred to the European level (not necessarily its own institutional quarters) 
sufficient policy leverage to make the neo-liberal project in telecommunications across 
the EU a ‘European’ project. The corollary generated has been efforts by Member States 
at resisting this. 
The ‘article 86’ controversy of the late 1980s was the first sign of such tension, and 
though legally ‘victorious’ the Commission emerged from this incident clear that it 
needed to pursue the development of telecommunications in a consensual manner. 
Nonetheless, the 1994 Bangemann Report recommended the creation of a European level 
regulatory authority for telecommunications (Bangemann Report 1994). This idea was 
not pursued by Member States, yet it re-surfaced in two subsequent, related, reviews of 
the mid to late 1990s, the 1997 review of the regulatory consequences of ICT 
convergence (European Commission 1997) and the subsequent 1999 Review of 
Electronic Communications (European Commission 1999).  As part of the negotiations 
leading to the ECRF which the latter review prefaced, the Commission proposed the 
creation of a High Level Communications Group, composed of members of NRAs, on 
which it would be granted have voting rights. This proposed injection of ‘Commission 
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supranationalism’ was fiercely resisted by Member States, resulting in the creation of the 
ERG by way of compromise, a much more path dependent outcome in structure and 
function.  
The negotiations leading to the ECRF also witnessed a struggle for regulatory power 
between the Commission and Member States over the right to veto NRA decisions 
related to the designation of Significant Market Power in domestic telecommunications 
markets. Here, the Commission gained highly significant ground, accruing right to veto 
NRA decisions regarding the designation of operators as having SMP and the designation 
of new telecommunications markets requiring ex ante sector specific regulation. The 
Commission, did not, however, acquire a much coveted right of veto over regulatory 
remedies prescribed by NRAs (Humphreys and Simpson 2005), something which has re-
surfaced as key issue of contestation in the current review of the ECRF. 
 
THE 2006 REVIEW OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK AND THE EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS 
AUTHORITY 
The EU’s latest review of its regulatory framework in telecommunications illustrates two 
contrasting features of the evolving system. On the one hand, the extent to which the 
regulatory state in telecommunications has become embedded at the national and 
European levels is strikingly in evidence. Yet on the other, it is also clear that a 
comprehensive, efficiently functioning SEM in telecommunications has by no means 
been completed. In June 2006, the Commission launched a by now familiar (this time two 
phase) consultation process on further possible modification of the ECRF, through laying 
out a series of proposals for interested parties to reflect upon. These modifications had six 
main dimensions: the creation of a new approach to regulation of the radio spectrum; 
action to rationalise and make more efficient the well-established system of 
telecommunications market reviews undertaken by NRAs in conjunction with the 
Commission; a series of measures with the goal of consolidating the SEM in 
telecommunications, prominent among which was the proposal of a right of veto for the 
Commission over market remedies; a series of measures focused on improving the public 
service dimension of telecommunications provision;  a proposed new set of regulatory 
requirements on NRAs and communications services providers to improve security; and 
four measures of what were described as a modernisation and updating kind, the most 
substantive of which was the repeal of the 2000 Regulation on local loop unbundling 
(European Parliament and Council 2000) such was the degree of competition now 
deemed in existence in Member States’ local loops (European Commission 2006a; 
European Commission 2006b). Very importantly, at this juncture any proposal to create 
EECMA was highly conspicuous by its absence. 
However, a year later, in November 2007, after the consultation phase had concluded, 
the Commission released a report to Member States in which its proposed changes were 
re-presented under three broad categories, the proposal of EECMA assuming centre stage 
in one of these. Under the heading of so-called ‘better regulation’ came a radical and 
what has turned out to be unpopular proposal to reduce, from 18 to 7, the number of 
telecommunications markets subject to ex-ante regulation, as well as  ones to simplify the 
market review procedure and radio spectrum regulation. A second category, ‘connecting 
with citizens’ grouped the initial proposals for universal service and security. Thirdly, 
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‘completing the single market in electronic communications’ now contained the proposal 
to create EECMA based on the persistence of ‘regulatory inconsistency and distortions of 
competition’ (European Commission 2007a: 4). EECMA would also be accompanied by 
a strengthening of the independence and regulatory enforcement powers of NRAs. The 
formerly most controversial element of the initial proposals, the proposed right of veto on 
remedies for the Commission, was now described as an oversight role to be undertaken in 
cooperation with the new authority, which had by now eclipsed it as the most 
controversial element of the proposed alterations to the ECRF. The revised proposals 
were accompanied by two new draft directives and a draft regulation related to the 
establishment of EECMA. 
In its summary review document, the justification for EECMA was couched in terms 
of strong signals sent to the Commission as a result of the second phase of the 
consultation on the ECRF review. Here, the Commission reported criticism of the ERG’s 
performance which it was argued delivered ‘only loose coordination among regulators’ 
and a ‘“lowest common denominator” approach’. Despite this, it was acknowledged 
explicitly that ‘Member States had reservations about “ceding powers” to the 
Commission’ (European Commission 2007a: 9). The industry support which the 
Commission so often in the past drew on to justify its action was also present now, 
though far from overwhelming in nature. The Commission claimed that new 
telecommunications players along with ‘some’ (ibid) incumbents were in favour of either 
institutional reform of the ERG or a stronger role for the Commission, though neither of 
these preferences suggest automatically the creation of an entirely new organisation like 
EECMA. The following section examines the politics behind the proposal of EECMA 
focusing on the relationship between the Commission and the ERG in the period 
preceding its emergence. It also analyses the proposed institutional features of EECMA 
explaining in the process how in its current guise the proposal marks a radical departure 
from the kind of evolutionary path assumed by EU telecommunications policy to date. 
 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE ERG AND THE POLITICS OF EECMA 
The proposal by the European Commission of EECMA was not included in either 
phases of the consultation on the review of the ECRF. However, in June 2006, Viviane 
Reding, the information society and media commissioner, announced the Commission’s 
intention to create a European level regulatory authority for telecommunications in order 
to deliver a more effectively functioning EU telecommunications market (Financial 
Times, 28.6.06; European Voice 16.11.06). It appears that the Commission’s ongoing 
conflict with the German government over proposed legislation to afford a regulatory 
holiday to the German incumbent Deutsche Telekom to allow it to invest in broadband 
infrastructure free from competition, was a significant factor in strengthening the 
Commission’s resolve to propose EECMA (European Voice, 16.11.06). However, the 
debate on the best way to ensure that so-called Next Generation Networks are deployed 
as quickly as possible is very much an open one and unlikely to be resolved by the 
creation of EECMA or a variant thereof. The Commission’s final report on the review 
was claimed to have been delayed by several months due to its desire to smooth the 
proposal to introduce EECMA (European Voice, 30.8.07).  
The creation of the new authority along the lines proposed by the Commission would 
involve, effectively, an institutional ‘supranationalisation’ of the ERG. The 
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Commission’s declaration of intent signalled the onset of a period of negotiation between  
itself and the ERG right up to the point of the publication of the final proposals to 
Member States in November 2007. Analysis of this gives a clear indication of the 
fractious politics of the initiative, where the Commission and the ERG’s Head ‘often did 
not agree with each other’ (Reding 2007c: 10) on the former’s admission. The idea for 
EECMA seems also to have been bound up in the bid by the Commission, articulated at 
the outset of the consultation, to secure extension of its veto to the regulatory remedies 
proposed by NRAs. In November 2006, in an apparent softening of her initial stance, 
Viviane Reding, Information and Media Commissioner, wrote to the ERG, appearing to 
use the proposal to create, what was at that time described as ‘“the enhanced ERG”’, 
instead of pursuing extra Commission powers regarding remedies. She here claimed 
willingness to ‘give serious consideration to the option of relying in future on the ERG 
and national regulatory authorities for more consistency in the internal market’. However, 
tellingly, she also noted that ‘concrete proposals are needed for new institutional 
arrangements that would transform the ERG into a more efficient and more accountable 
permanent body with independent powers for ensuing consistency in the application of 
the regulatory framework (Reding 2006a: 2). The intention was that the ERG ‘would be 
transformed, by means of a legal instrument to be adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council of Ministers into a new permanent and independent body responsible for 
electronic communications networks and markets
This bargaining position was re-emphasised by Fabio Colasanti, deputy to Reding, in 
a follow-up communication to the ERG which took place after a meeting between both 
parties in January 2007. The political carrot for the ERG presented here was the 
possibility of taking over regulatory control for the enforcement of the ‘article 7’ 
procedure or, more specifically, a proposed modified form to include remedies. This 
would also clearly have dissolved the brewing discontent over the Commission’s desire 
to extend involvement here. The less politically involved alternative was also presented, 
namely that the ERG undertake such work in an advisory capacity only (Colasanti 2007) 
leaving the consequent regulatory enforcement duties to the Commission, something 
more akin to the current role of the ERG. Somewhat boldly, the Commission, in this 
communication, also raised the possibility of the new regulatory body assuming some 
responsibility for communications content regulation, this justified on the basis of the 
move in this direction made by some NRAs (ibid), giving a strong flavour of the 
ambitious mood the Commission appeared to be in.  
’ (Reding 2006a: 4, emphasis in 
original).  
In late February 2007, the ERG provided a detailed position on the Commission’s 
proposals expressing outright opposition to the use of a ‘veto as a formal oversight 
mechanism’ (Viola 2007: annex 2, p1) contained in both of the institutional options 
presented to it by the Commission. Instead, it put forward a much more limited 
development of the so-called current Article 7 provisions (relating to the Commission’s 
veto over SMP matters) into a ‘more streamlined and targeted approach’ (Viola 2007: 
annex 2, p2). Here, after 2010, NRAs would provide market reviews to the ERG which it 
would scrutinise, though only at the request of an NRA or the Commission, or its own 
self-initiative. In fact, consideration of Article 7 issues, it argued, would become the 
exception rather than the rule. This was justified on the rather dubious assumption that by 
then ‘“consistency” will become less and less of an issue’ (ibid). The ERG was more 
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amenable to extending its powers in respect of ‘a regulatory “coordination” function, 
rather than on article 7’ (Viola 2007: annex 2, p3). 
Taking this forward, the ERG posited three possible scenarios for extending its 
powers. First, some formalisation of its advisory role in the specific production by the 
Commission of legislative proposals in telecommunications could occur. This role could 
range from providing advice before the Commission writes a proposal, to mandating the 
ERG to create a legislative proposal itself for automatic consideration by the 
Communications Committee. Interestingly, the ERG urged the Commission to increase 
the latter’s involvement in the legislation formation process in any event. Second, the 
ERG could be granted a formal role in the legislative process possibly in addition to the 
first option. Here, it was proposed to give it the remit of forming a comitology committee 
to deal with issues arising from Commission Decisions which were themselves the 
responsibility of NRAs to implement. With regard to Directives and Regulations, the 
ERG suggested that it might be given ‘one or two readings of draft legislation prior to 
readings by the European Parliament’ (Viola 2007: annex 2, p5.). Third, the ERG argued 
that the responsibility for decision-taking could be given to the ERG where it ‘would 
have the power to define and implement a European strategy in those areas where 
coordinated action was warranted. NRAs would remain central constituent parts of the 
“federal” system’ (ibid). The legal measures thus created by the ERG would be binding 
on all NRAs and Member States. Clearly, each of these options suggested strongly that 
the ERG was not averse to the strengthening of its powers. However, it did not want its 
institutional status changed in the process from fundamentally ‘intergovernmental’ to 
‘supranational’. 
The ERG was careful to point out, however, that pursuit of any of these three options 
would ‘require the development of clear subsidiarity-based criteria to define more 
precisely the class of areas where coordinated and/or centralised action was warranted’ 
(ibid). The ERG also took significant pains to emphasise how it was developing its 
regulatory competence through self-initiative. Here mentioned were studies on how to 
promote regulatory best practice; the undertaking of remedies case studies and the 
establishment of regulatory knowledge centres among NRAs (Viola 2007: annex 1, p3). 
Two weeks prior to the Commission’s mid-November 2007 publication of its proposals 
for the modification of the ECRF, the ERG put forward a final position statement with a 
view to influencing the outcome of the Commission’s deliberations. Essentially 
reiterating its previous position, the document again tried at length to demonstrate how 
the ERG had made significant achievements already, going beyond what might 
reasonably be expected from a consultation body. It made detailed reference to the series 
of reform measures (enunciated in the Madeira Declaration) enacted at the end of 2006, 
amounting to what it described as ‘a major step-change’. Notable among these is an 
agreement with the institutionally overlapping International Regulators Group to ensure 
that the ERG’s Secretariat would be in the future better resourced financially to undertake 
its business. The ERG also introduced majority voting. This can be seen as a move to 
align further the ERG away from the EU and the Commission -  it certainly appeared to 
be interpreted as such by the latter.  
The ERG made specific policy proposals falling short of the degree of 
Europeanisation the Commission had in mind. A formalisation of the cooperation 
between the Commission’s Article 7 Task Force and the ERG’s Article 7 Expert Groups 
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was advocated. Second, it was argued that the Commission should engage in a formal 
consultation procedure with the ERG whose subsequent opinions would ‘enhance 
regulatory certainty for stakeholders’ (Voila 2007b: 3). Third, it was argued that the 
Commission could invite the ERG to work with it on the drafting of implementation 
measures related to the ECRF, such as Recommendations and Guidelines. Finally, the 
ERG offered to involve the Commission at an earlier stage in the drafting of its work 
programme. The ERG Chair argued that ‘amendment to the ERG Decision could reflect 
the proposals outlined…with minimum delay, and at minimum cost and bureaucratic 
impact, and in particular without the need for a complex and lengthy legislative process’  
(Viola 2007: 4).  
 
EECMA: INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The Commission issued its proposals for reform on November 13 2007, which 
essentially reflected its position held in the negotiations with the ERG throughout 2007. 
The draft regulation that would establish EECMA gives a clear indication of the extent to 
which, if agreed to by Member States, it would create supranational institutional authority 
in EU telecommunications governance. EECMA would be an independent body 
established at the EU institutional level, accountable to the European Parliament. Very 
importantly, it would only play an advisory role for the Commission on core regulatory 
matters. EECMA would be established according to the general principles created in 
2005 by the Commission, and recently further elaborated (European Commission 2008) 
for the functioning of European regulatory agencies. It would be governed directly by a 
Board comprising the heads of the EU’s telecommunications NRAs (European 
Commission 2007b).   
The Commission was unequivocal, in proposing EECMA, in its criticism of the 
current pattern of regulation in the ECRF. Appearing not to take account of the 
aforementioned changes in ERG voting, it was particularly critical of the modus operandi 
of the ERG where it argued that consensus-based decision-making meant that ‘common 
approaches [were] difficult and slow to achieve’ or even ‘impossible’ where  substantial 
differences existed between regulators. It cited a number of regulatory deficiencies in the 
ERG’s performance, such as divergent remedies at the national level, variations in rights 
of use conditions, the existence of different numbers nationally for the same transnational 
service and ineffectual handling of cross-border disputes (European Commission 2007: 
16). The Commission was also overtly critical of the IRG, hinting at an unsatisfactory 
relationship between it and the ERG where the former ‘influences Community regulatory 
approaches [yet] has neither any obligation to implement Community Law nor any duty 
to report to the Commission’ (European Commission 2007: 5). In a subsequent 
explanatory communication from Vivane Reding to the ERG, in December 2007, the 
legal establishment of the IRG as a private law body was criticised as ‘add[ing] some 
complexity and yet another player to the regulatory process in addition to the ERG’ 
(Reding 2007c: 5). The ERG reacted by indicating its view that the proposal ‘appear[ed], 
at a prima-facie analysis, not to be in line with the evolution of the cooperation amongst 
regulators toward a federal and non-bureaucratic model, as advocated by the ERG’ (ERG 
2007: 1). 
In dismissing the possibility of creating a strengthened ERG with more incisive 
decision-making powers (instead of EECMA) through instigation of majority voting, the 
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Commission argued that, procedurally, such a change would still not allow the ERG to 
issue binding decisions on its members, since legally only the Commission is able to do 
this (European Commission 2007: 6). The Commission also argued that, structurally and 
procedurally, the ERG needed a major overhaul requiring an injection of resources that 
could only come from the EU, since ‘the Commission must be sure that its opinions and 
advice are transparent, accountable and independent’ (ibid). The only solution, argued the 
Commission, was for the ERG to be transformed into ‘a Community body subject to the 
same rules of administration and budget that apply to all community bodies’ (ibid), thus 
serving to internalise the kind of detailed work essential to the smooth functioning of the 
‘regulatory’ state at the European and national levels in telecommunications.  
The clear supranational nature of EECMA is evident in the Commission’s claim that 
it would reinforce the powers of NRAs ‘by taking over the functions of the ERG and 
giving them a robust and transparent foundation in Community law’ (ibid).  EECMA was 
also necessary to deal with a growing number of regulatory issues of a transnational 
nature which were not within the remit, by definition, of NRAs. Here, mobile and IP 
based services were specifically mentioned. Initial plans in the review for the creation of 
a separate agency for the regulation of radio spectrum were dropped by the Commission 
(European Voice, 30.8.07), further enlarging the potential remit of EECMA in an 
important and expanding regulatory sub-field of communication. In creating EECMA, it 
is clear that the Commission anticipates a comprehensive attitudinal transformation 
among NRA members that would make it up, itself a classic element of 
supranationalisation. EECMA’s proposed Board of Regulators would ‘comprise the 
heads of NRAs and will work in the Community interest’ (European Commission 2007: 
9) which is something rather different from the operational philosophy of the ERG. It has 
also been reported that the Commission intends EECMA to be much less consultative 
than the ERG has been (European Voice, 30.8.07).  
The specific details of the draft EECMA regulation gives a strong indication of its 
functional breadth where article 3 specifies as many as nine different general activities 
broadly around issuing opinions and providing assistance at the request of the 
Commission, dissemination of information to market players, as well as taking specific 
‘European level’ decisions on rights of use matters related to numbers from the European 
Telephone Numbering Space (European Commission 2007: 31). Article 4 of the directive 
indicates the kind of very close operational relationship which is likely to develop 
between the European Commission and EECMA, where the former could request an 
opinion ‘on all matters regarding electronic communications’ (European Commission 
2007: 24). Clearly, this could create a very large workload and, given the complexity of 
the array of issues which the Commission has to deal with, the intention would appear to 
be to draw heavily on its expertise in the many specifically mentioned areas. Just some of 
these are: market definition, SMP and remedies; identification of transnational markets; 
specific national market analysis; provision of necessary information to end-users; quality 
of service; transparency measures in relation to local loop unbundling; key issues in 
relation to access and authorisations. In other words, such work cuts across the whole 
complex gamut of regulatory issues which are integral to the attempt to create and police 
competition in the telecommunications sector across the EU. 
Articles 5 to 23 of the draft regulation specify in more detail the precise tasks which 
EECMA would be assigned.  For example, in terms of market reviews, under article 6 
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EECMA would be required to put forward specific measures such as designating 
companies which it considers to hold SMP, for example, in situations where it finds 
ineffectively functioning competition (European Commission 2007: 26). The same 
situation broadly pertains regarding the definition and analysis of transnational markets 
(article 7). The Commission proposes that EECMA will take on the burdensome task of 
the annual review of the telecommunications sector hitherto assigned to it.  
Structurally, as well as a Director and a Chief Network Security Officer, EECMA 
would be made up of a Board of Directors, an Administrative Board, a Permanent 
Stakeholders Group and a Board of Appeal. The key body, the Board of Regulators, 
would contain the Heads of the NRAs of each EU Member State, EECMA’s Director and 
a non-voting member of the European Commission. Very importantly, the draft 
regulation to establish EECMA stipulates that the Board shall take action on the basis of 
a simple majority vote (European Commission 2007: 37). It would be responsible for 
undertaking the main bulk of EECMA’s work, referred to in articles 4-23 of the draft 
regulation, including approval of its programme of work for a forthcoming year. The 
Administrative Board of EECMA would be responsible for the formal appointment of the 
Board of Regulators and the Board of Appeal. It would adopt annually the EECMA 
workplan (after consultation with the Commission) and annual report on EECMA’s 
activities, both of which it would be required to send to the European Parliament, the 
Council of Ministers and the Commission itself (European Commission 2007: 36). 
Reaction to the proposal of EECMA beyond the confines of the ERG, which would 
be most directly affected by it, has been, on the whole, equally negative. It has been 
claimed that the EU is not in a ‘political mood…to set up more supra-national bodies’ 
(Financial Times, 29.6.06). Rather, the EECMA initiative had ‘irked almost everyone. 
Member states, big industry operators, fellow commissioners and even the watchdogs 
themselves have problems with it’ (Financial Times 16.11.07; see also O’Brien 2007). 
The UK regulator, Ofcom, maintained that the current regulatory power balance between 
the Commission and NRAs was appropriate and argued that the ‘proposal for a central 
regulator received little support during the creation of the existing rules [1999-2002] and 
we see no reason why it might be appropriate now’ (Laitner, 2006: 1). It praised the 
political independence of the ERG as a particularly attractive quality, arguing that 
EECMA would be subject to political interference by both the Commission and Member 
States (Financial Times, 30.10.07). In the initial consideration of the proposal in the 
Council of Ministers, the EU has reported significant opposition from Member States 
(European Council of Ministers 2007: 10). Given this level of negativity, it has even been 
suggested that the proposal of EECMA is a political tactic of the European Commission, 
where Viviane Reding ‘outlines outlandish ideas, then waits for the air to clear before 
returning to the table to get the deal she really wants’, in this case, possibly, some form of 
greater power for the EU over telecommunications regulation (Laitner 2007: 1). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The proposal of EECMA by the European Commission is another important juncture in 
the Europeanisation of telecommunications governance begun more than 20 years ago. 
The idea of creating a European level regulatory authority for telecommunications, 
though not new, remains controversial. EECMA represents a radical departure from the 
kind of institution-building which has occurred thus far in the development of the neo-
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liberal telecommunications order across the EU. Though impossible to determine at the 
time of writing, most evidence suggests that Member States are unlikely to agree to the 
Commission’s proposal in its current form. In practical terms, much of what EECMA 
would be, and would do, is far from radical. It could well be viewed even as the next 
logical stage of an ongoing process. Dealing at the EU level with the persistent regulatory 
problems in telecommunications markets highlighted by the Commission seems sensible. 
However, commitment made to any European project – and in telecommunications this 
has been significant - requires the development of a European outlook and a set of 
practices commensurate with this. The essential problem for EU Member States stems 
from the deep historical national-centricity of the sector and its governance which yielded 
the ‘neo-liberal dilemma’: to gain the opportunity to benefit from international 
competition, domestic markets must be opened and made as competitive as those of 
potential competitors. Though a detailed and complex system of regulation has been 
developed through the EU, the result is predominantly ‘intergovernmental’ in nature, 
including those elements constituted at the EU level. The legislative framework, and the 
institutional apparatus for producing and refining it, is European but the operational 
control of the telecommunications markets of EU states is overwhelmingly still in the 
hands of national level interests. Any effort to broaden the regulatory apparatus beyond 
the legislative at EU level within the EU institutional framework has been viewed 
suspiciously.  
The exception in this picture is the European Commission whose outlook is European 
in nature and thus much more attuned to the ‘supranational’. Despite its role as champion, 
on the one hand, and ‘honest broker’, on the other, of neo-liberal competition in 
telecommunications, its ‘policy entrepreneurial’ activities aimed at enhancing the EU 
institutional remit in telecommunications has never been far from the surface of the 
policy debate. EECMA is simply the latest incarnation of this. On the one hand, 
Commissioner Reding has argued that ‘Centralism has no place in Europe. Instead, 
decentralisation is a guiding principle of European law’ (Reding 2007: 4), yet on the 
other she has claimed that EECMA ‘needs to bring out the best of the national regulators, 
but it needs – and this is crucial – it needs to be more than just the sum of all its national 
parts. It needs… to have a European approach, a European vision’ (Reding 2007: 4, 28 
Nov speech).  
A core issue for Member States is likely to be oversight and accountability of 
EECMA. Its political principal would be the European Parliament, relatively 
inexperienced in telecommunications, though, in practice, the European Commission, 
with over two decades of detailed involvement in telecommunications and a closer ‘on 
the ground’ interaction with EECMA, would play a much more influential role. Creating 
EECMA would bring the current ERG, very much an ‘intergovernmental’ organisation in 
outlook, into the European institutional fold. This would require an attitudinal journey, 
from national to European, to be undertaken by the NRAs whose members would 
comprise its Board. A core issue in the new proposed system is undoubtedly the power to 
be afforded to the Commission. EECMA would be an advisory body only on all issues 
bar those of a transnational nature, over which it would have decision-making authority. 
In other words, this would tie it in, to a much greater extent than was the case with the 
ERG, to the Commission. In essence, EECMA can be viewed as a way for the 
Commission to get its desired veto on remedies by the back door. However, because of 
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the nature of EECMA, beyond this, it could also provide a step towards further 
supranationalisation of telecommunications regulation in Europe. Clearly, this would 
mark a major change in the nature of EU telecommunications policy as it has developed 
to date. Such a move is unlikely to secure the agreement of Member States. Instead, it has 
been suggested that some form of compromise position might be the most likely 
outcome, where a much more intergovernmental-like committee, along the lines of the 
Lamfalussy committees that deal with securities markets, banking and insurance, might 
be the outcome of the current debate on EECMA (Financial Times, 16.11.07). In any 
event, the creation of EECMA, a watered down variant of it, or even the agreement of a 
right of veto for the Commission to be extended to remedies, would not suggest that ex-
ante regulation of telecommunications is likely to disappear, despite claims that 
eventually competition authorities will be able to take over the supervision of all 
telecommunications markets (European Voice, 29.3.07). The regulatory state in 
telecommunications will be around for some considerable time to come. 
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